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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this work is to investigate the pre and post going public process of the operational, employment, financial and dividend policy performance of twenty-five Portuguese family companies in most of the sectors of economic activity that went public through public share offering, direct sale. That is, this work develops a framework to conclude if the decision to open the capital by the traditional family firms to the investors, in general, had caused or not improvements on the economic and financial health of those firms. Going public means that an entrepreneur gives up 'private benefits of control' 17 .
On the operational side, we find relevant declines in profitability, operating efficiency and activity levels, but an increase in capital investment and real output. On the employment side, we document an irrelevant decline on employment. On the financial side, we observe that the financial equilibrium of firms after going public was negatively affected. On the dividend side, we document an increase in the dividend payout. Lastly, our results are generally 17 The 'private benefits' can also be regarded as costs saved by a firm for not being traded publicly robust surviving the partition of the dataset into various sub-samples.
Too many business people, too many family companies, going public are the ultimate badge of success, the proof that their hard work for many years has been worthwhile. Nevertheless, this extremely important move should be made only after entrepreneurs carefully calculate their costs, benefits, namely, in terms of performance, and risks. Going public may is the best possible strategy for the family firms, cementing and even magnifying their success. Or it may be a disaster, undermining the management team's hard work and transforming a strong company into a failure. It is impossible to know ahead of time which possibility will be realised, but these firms that want to go public must take some basic steps and analysis to ensure that their decision is a sound one and that their chances of success are high.
The initial public offering (IPO) is frequently the largest equity issue a corporation ever makes. Every year, an average of one-third of all the funds raised through common equity is raised through going public. The going public process is also an important channel through which an entrepreneur or venture capitalist gets rewarded for his initial effort. The understanding of the process of going public is critical to any attempt both to increase equity financing and to stimulate entrepreneurial and venture capitalist activities.
IPO's are one of the most researched fields in finance. Mostly, the focus of that research has been the anomalies such us short-run underpricing and long-term underperformance. For the long run underperformance, the focus has almost always been on the stock price performance, with a few exceptions, such as, Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) , who investigate the operating performance of US IPO´s after going public. Outside the US, this type of investigation is even scarcer. This was the main reason that motivates us to investigate the operational, financial, employment and dividend performance of IPO Portuguese firms. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to do such study on the Portuguese IPO´s.
This investigation wants to contribute to the clarification of this notion. Our study examines how the process of opening the capital to the public in a sample of Portuguese companies affects the financial and operational performance of the former closely-held operations. Since, in Portugal, family firms, little and medium enterprises (PME), are the great majority of all Portuguese firms, this issue is of crucial importance, the analysis conducted in this study seeks to find out whether selling part of the capital of these PME in Portugal is truly desirable for the families and their descendants. The scope is not only limited to economic aspects of firms after going public but also, it is oriented to the social and financial consequences on firms of the going public process. In particular, this work tries to determine whether, after going public, these firms increase (1) their profitability, (2) their operating efficiency, (3) their capital investment, (4) their real output, (5) their employment, (6) their dividend policy (7) their activity levels, (8) their short-term equilibrium and (9) their capital structure.
Jain and Kini [1994] found that family companies exhibit a decline in post-issue operating performance, as measured by the operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated by assets, relative to their pre-going public levels, both before and after industry adjustments. According to them, there are a number of potential explanations for the decline in the post-issue operating performance after firms go public. One explanation is related to the potential for increased agency costs when a company makes the transition from private to public ownership. As a result of the heightened conflict of interest between initial owners and shareholders, the performance of the firm could suffer as managers have more incentives. A second reason could be that manager's attempt to windowdress their accounting numbers prior to going public. This will lead to the pre-IPO performance being overstated and post-IPO performance being understated. A third explanation for the decline in operating performance is that entrepreneurs time their issues to coincide with periods of unusually good performance levels, which they know cannot be sustained in the future.
Our work goes beyond what was done by Anderson and Reeb (2003) , since the work is extended to several subsamples, besides the whole sample, such as: (1) Companies operating in competitive industries and companies operating in non-competitive industries (2) Companies with national allocation of control (more than fifty percent) and companies with foreign allocation of control (3) Firms with a new CEO after going public and firms with no changes in CEO after going public (4) Firms with a concentrated structure after going public and firms with a no-concentrated structure after going public (5) Firms going public by IPO and firms going public by direct sale (6) firms that have shareholders in management after going public and firms that do not have shareholders in management after going public and (7) Firms that were restructured before going public and firms that were not restructured before going public. We feel that, in Portugal, there is a knowledge gap about the operational, social and financial performance and dividend policy of firms after going public. Our work wants to fill that gap and we feel that a multi-industry sample of family firms provides a general perspective of the consequences of opening the capital to the public and give us interesting opportunities to identify the consequences for firms after going public Using conventional multivariate pre-versus post initial public offerings (IPO) and direct sales (DS) comparisons, we research those consequences on performance changes in closely-held firms after the going public process.
This study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical and empirical research on the process of going public for the closely-held companies. Data and sample collection we employ are described in Section 3. Section 4 describes the methodology, empirical proxies and testable predictions. Section 5 presents the empirical results for the full sample and for all sub-samples. Section 6 presents the summary and conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of social interaction and it is directly related to the performance behaviour of firms after going public. We can say that an agency relationship has arisen between two or more parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative of the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems. Agency theory has brought the roles of managerial decision rights and several external and internal monitoring and bonding mechanisms to the forefront of theoretical discussions and empirical research.
Agency costs arise when the interests of the firm's managers are not aligned with those of the firm's owner and take the form of preference for onthe-job perks and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth. The magnitude of these costs is limited by how well the owners and delegated third parties, such as banks, monitor the actions of the outside managers.
Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders, such as managers and controlling shareholders, on the one hand, and outside investors, such as minority shareholders, on the other hand, are central to the analysis of the modern company. The insiders who control corporate assets can use these assets for a range of purposes that are detrimental to the interests of the outside investors. In other words, they can divert corporate assets to themselves, through outright theft, dilution of outside investors through share issues to the insiders, excessive salaries, asset sales to themselves or other corporations they control at favourable prices or transfer pricing with other entities they control.
Agency costs should be lower at firms where a single family controls more than 50 percent of the firm's equity. At a small, family company where a single family controls the firm, the controlling family also fulfils the monitoring role that large blockholders perform at publicly traded corporations. Agency costs should increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders. As the number of shareholders increase, the free-rider problem reduces the incentives for limited-liability shareholders to monitor. With less monitoring, agency costs increase. Also, agency costs should be higher at firms managed by an outsider.
One of the principal remedies to agency problems is the law. The corporate and other law gives outside investors, including shareholders, certain powers to protect their investment against expropriation by insiders. These powers in the case of shareholders range from the right to receive the same per share dividends as the insiders, to the right to vote on important corporate matters, including the election of directors, to the right to sue the company for damages.
Okamura and Cowling (2002) prove the poor operating performance of Japanese IPO companies. At the same time, Kim, Kitsabunnarat and Nofsinger (2004), look at the emerging market of Thailand and conclude that the magnitude of the decrease in performance after flotation is much significant in Thailand than in the US. That is, literature agrees that a significant decline in operating performance is related to the going public decision; the tendency of new IPO´s to underperform in the long run is one of the less well-understood tendencies.
One of the major hypotheses explicating such post-issue underperformance is the consequence of changing ownership. Going public increases agency problems by the dispersion of ownership. It is assumed that agency cost increases as the conflict between managers and shareholders become worse since ownership becomes disperse after the IPO.
The pros and cons of going public are the same for both strategies presented above, but they will carry different weights depending on the company ultimate goal. According to Anderson and Reeb (2003) , the pros are as follows:
1. The principal advantage of going public is that it provides an immediate influx of capital; 2. If the company stock performs well in the aftermarket (if it is listed), the company can raise more cash later through additional equity offerings; 3. Public companies tend to be more valuable than comparable private companies due to an increased liquidity and, as public companies, can win costumers, secure financing or expand to other markets.
4. Going public gives the company the opportunity to offer vendors, suppliers and employees stock or stock options, giving these individuals a stake in the company's success.
5. The stock market also provides a managerial discipline device, both by creating the danger of hostile takeovers and by exposing the market's assessment of managerial decisions;
6. Finally, going public the companies' shareholders find an easy way to liquidate some of their investment, simply by selling stock. In the meantime, their stock can be used as collateral to secure personal loans.
Having seen the pros, the cons of going public are as follows:
1. Going public absorb far more of management's time, energy, and effort. The energy drain goes on for months and is far more than an inconvenience; 2. As new shareholders are added, the shareholder power to control the company is diluted. Although control of a company typically is not lost by going public, future offerings could cause loss of control.
3. Related to a loss of control is a reduction in flexibility. The main shareholder will have to include the new shareholders and directors in many decisions;
4. In addition to the cost of investor and public relations, the company may face some additional costs as a public company; 5. Fluctuations in the stock market (if the company is listed) will affect the company's value; 6. Stock sales by insiders are limited, which restricts the ability to get out of the business. Therefore, the IPO's advantages as an exit strategy for insiders can be restricted significantly.
DATA AND SAMPLE COLLECTION
Our empirical work is done for family companies that fully or partially open their capital to outside investors through an Initial Public Offering or Direct Sale, We select firms that have their initial share public offering and have, at least, three annual observations of operational, social and financial data in the years N-5 to N-1 and in the period N+1 to N+5, where the year of going public is defined as year N.
In all cases, we required directly from the firms: (1) the offering prospectus for their initial offer, which invariably presents several years of pre going public financial data, as well as details about the public offer itself, and (2) the annual reports from the post going public periods. Most of the companies we approached fully or partially complied with our requests. In multiple cases, we supplemented financial statements sent to us with secondary sources, namely, commercial banks, Bank of Portugal and Euronext Lisbon databases. We also had personal contacts with managers of some of the firms. In the case of doubts about some aspects of the firms, we also made several phone call contacts. In a few cases, we had an interview with the chief financial officer (CFO). Our data includes twenty-five firms that went public. Therefore, our data span a larger time period than any other initial public offering study in Portugal. Table 1 provides descriptive information on these companies included in our database: the name of the company, type of industry, the date and the percentage of capital that was sold at the date of the sale. 
METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL PROXIES AND TESTABLE PREDICTIONS
In the first part of the methodology, we use the Wilcoxon test for measuring post-operational and financial performance. In the second stage of empirical testing, we develop the Kruskal-Wallis methodology for testing the significant differences between the subsamples.
The Wilcoxon signed rank test for measuring post-operational and financial performance
Family company holders expect that the going public process will be the solution for the problems that most family-owned enterprises face today, such as, low operating efficiency, low profitability, low output, weak capital structure, etc. They expect that with fresh capital and new owners, companies will become financial healthier. We first compute empirical proxies for each company for the three years before to the available years after the sale of capital through the IPO. We then compute median and means of each variable for the pre going public period (years N-5 to N-1) and post going public periods (years N+1 to N+5. The year of the IPO, year N, is excluded from the analysis because it includes both the months before and the months after going public. 
Subsamples, empirical proxies and testable predictions
The primary objective of this study is to test whether family companies improve their financial and operational performance after going public. In the first stage of empirical testing, in order to pursue this primary objective to examine the post going public behaviour of firms, we study the following performance areas: profitability (return on sales), operating efficiency (sales efficiency), capital investment (real capital expenditure to sales), real output (real sales), employment (total employment), dividend policy (dividend to sales), activity levels (sales to total assets), short-term financial equilibrium (cash and banks to short-term debt) and capital structure (total debt to total assets).The subsamples are presented in Table 2 .
Having computed pre-and post-going public means and medians, we used the Wilcoxon signedrank test, as one of the methods of testing for significant changes in the variables. We test the following hypotheses for the going public process: (1) it decreases a firm's profitability, (2) it decreases a firm's operating efficiency, (3) it increases its capital investment spending, (4) it increases its output, (5) it decreases employment, (6) it increases its payout ratio, (7) it decreases its activity levels (8) it improves its short run financial equilibrium, (9) and it improves its capital structure. Table 3 presents a summary of testable predictions, including: in the first place, the performance areas. We examine for changes resulting from the going public decision. In the second place, we include the financial indicators used for each performance area. Among them, to establish the predicted relationship, we chose the indicator with the best characteristics to get the best knowledge of each area of performance. In addition, we added the predicted changes in the financial indicators after the going public process, based on our beliefs on the post going public performance. The results of the full sample are presented in Table 4 . We next present the empirical proxies for each determinant predicted to affect post-IPO performance. We will describe how we expect each variable to impact the newly-going public firm's financial and operating performance. In addition to analysing the full sample of closely-held firms, we also cut out our full sample into several dichotomous subsamples, as in the following sections. 
Competitive versus non-competitive analysis
Several researchers are convinced that the organisational structure of competitive and the noncompetitive markets are well different ( Table 5 ). The explanation for separating the sample into competitive and non-competitive industries is understandable since the competitive and the noncompetitive markets have specific function rules. According to D'Souza and Megginson (1999), competitive firms are defined as "those that are subject to international product market competition, and non-competitive firms as those that are relatively free of product market competition". We expect that, in general, considering the different performance variables, companies in competitive markets are in a good position to get better results than companies integrated into non-competitive markets. Of the 25 companies for which we have data, 18 firms (72 percent) are operating in competitive industries.
Foreign versus national allocation of control analysis
It is relevant to investigate the influence of foreign investment and management know-how on post going public operational and financial performance, as compared to the post going public performance of national investments (Table 6 ). Smith et al. (1997) reported a significantly positive relationship between profitability and foreign ownership and a significantly negative relationship between leverage and foreign ownership.
We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of private ownership and foreign allocation of control on performance. We expect the greatest performance behaviour will result from going public in which foreign private owners gain control of the firm. In other words, we expect that foreign allocation of control will lead to performance changes after going public much more pronounced than in the case of national allocation of control. We are convinced that the same results would be observable for the Portuguese family companies that opened their capital going public through IPO or DS. In our sample, sixteen firms (64 percent) out of twenty-five companies had a national allocation of control and nine firms (36 percent) had a foreign allocation of control after privatisation. 
Change in Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
We also observe various post going public changes in a firm's CEO (Table 7) . Of the firms for which we have CEO and Board of Directors data, several of them changed their CEOs after going public. There is not much investigation on the influence of a change in CEO after the going public decision of the family company. Anderson and Reeb (2003) documented that family firms with the same family member CEO after going public, exhibit superior firm performance relative to a different CEO after the going public process, since, for them CEO stability is crucial to get a better performance The same authors concluded that CEOs who are family members (founders) exhibit a positive relation to accounting profitability measures.
We expect that changes in CEO will negatively impact the degree of post going public performance. We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to assess the impact of changes in CEO on post going public improvements. Therefore, we divide the sample into firms that had a new CEO after going public and firms with existing CEO continuing after going public. In our twenty-five data set, nine firms (36 percent) out of twenty-five, changed CEOs after going public. 
*rejection of H0 at five percent level of significance This table presents comparisons of performance changes for firms that have concentrated structure versus firms that have a more flexible structure (No Concentrated Structure). The table presents the results of the Wilcoxon rank sum Test (with its Z-statistic) -that is used as a test of significance for change in mean and median values between before and after closelyheld firms going public -and of the Kruskal-Wallis test firms that have concentrated structure versus firms that have a more flexible structure -in mean terms and in median terms respectively (statistic mentions the 'p' value using the chi-squared approximation) -for each empirical proxy and each subsample of the par. The table presents the number of useable observations, the mean and the median values of the proxy before and after closely-held firms going public, their change in the proxy's value after versus before those firms going public, the respective test of significance for the mean and median change, the mean rank of the KW test between Concentrated Structure and No Concentrated Structure subsample and the respectively statistic 'p' value for mean and median comparison.

Concentrated versus non-concentrated structure after going public
Changes between firms whose capital is concentrated in a few shareholders (it may be a family) after going public and firms with capital whose dispersion after going public is very high, is also investigated (Table 8) . Mikkelson and Partch (1989) provide evidence that decreases in ownership concentration of publicly traded firms lower share value. Based on those studies, it is natural to believe that the same will happen with Portuguese companies going public. Firms with very concentrated capital structures after going public, may have different performance levels from those firms with high dispersion of capital after going public; a concentrated structure will happen when the firm's capital is concentrated in a few shareholders and when, at least, one or a few owners, have more than 50% of capital the firm after going public. We expect that improvement changes in the financial performance will be much more pronounced in concentrated structures than in the case of non-concentrated structures. A firm was assumed with concentrated structure whenever the firm's capital is concentrated in a few shareholders and when, at least, one or a few owners have more than 50% of capital the firm after going public.
We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of a concentrated structure and non-concentrated structure after going public on post performance. We expect that firms going public that generate the largest concentration of ownership will generate the greatest performance improvements. In our sample, eight firms (32%) out of twenty-five have a concentrated structure after going public and seventeen firms (68%) have a nonconcentrated structure after going public. 
Firms going public by initial public offering (IPO) and firms going public by direct sale (DS)
When a firm goes public, the large volume of new shares sold, as well as the large volume of existing shares transferred to the new owners, lastingly shape the firm's ownership structure and thereby influence the firm's value (Table 9 ). To maximise the revenue raised from the shares sold in the public offering, it is important to design the sale of new shares with the final ownership in mind. We address how different methods for the sale of shares fare in establishing the appropriate ownership and maximising revenue. Does it matter that the sale disperses the shares through an IPO? Or is it better to pass on, through a Direct Sale, a block to someone who wants a controlling stake? And if this alternative is advantageous, then how should the company design a sale of shares to maximise expected revenue? There is no much evidence whether the going public method, IPO or DS, has a decision influence on operating and financial performance after going public. Nevertheless, based on Mello and Parsons (1998) investigation, we believe that firms going public by an initial public offering will give them an additional renown, a more favourable image and transparency with consequences on operational and financial performance.
We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of the IPO and Direct Sale on post going public performance. We expect that by using the method of IPO, in which some or of a family's entire stake in a family company is sold to investors through a public share offering, will positively impact the degree of post going public performance improvement because of several reasons, such as, better image, transparency and credibility. In our sample, thirteen firms (52%) out of twenty-five, went public by IPO and the remaining twelve firms (48%) went public by direct sale.
Firms that have shareholders in management versus firms that do not have shareholders in management
An initial public offering of common stock, more than any other corporate event, reflects the dilution of an owner/manager's stake. In most agency relationships, the owner will incur non-trivial monitoring costs in order to keep the agent in line. Consequently, the owner faces a trade-off between monitoring costs and forms of compensation that will cause the agent to always act in the owner's interest (Table 10) .
The rationale for splitting up the sample into firms that face different degrees of potential agency problems is straightforward. The nature of decisions that maximise the wealth of the firm's shareholders should be different these situations with consequences in the post going public performance. Our motivation for the analysis of these sub-samples is the evidence that management ownership seems to have a crucial role in the operational and financial performance of companies after going public. Mikkelson et al. (1997) with their univariate analysis, concluded that changes in or levels of the ownership stakes of officers and directors in firms that go public explain some change in performance among firms.
Based on kutsuna, K., H. Okamura and M. Cowling (2002) study, we expect that performance changes will be much more pronounced when firms have shareholders in management than in the case of firms that do not have shareholders in management. We suspect that this agency problem is more pronounced for closely held firms. We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of having shareholders in management and the effect of not having shareholders in management after going public on post performance. In a sample, nineteen out of twenty-five firms (76%) have shareholders in management after going public while six firms (24%) do not have shareholders in management after going public.
Restructuring companies prior to going public versus not restructuring
Some industries, just prior to going public, restructure through organisational changes and/or acquisitions and divestitures and/or financial restructurings (i.e., debt write-offs). One of the more complex issues in this area involves the interrelated questions of whether to restructure a family company prior to sale (Table 11) . We perform the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine the effect of restructuring. We divide the sample into firms that restructured and firms that did not restructure.
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), on their studies, show relevant improvements on the operational and financial performance of closely held companies, after they open their capital if firms had developed some kind of restructuring before they had gone public. Based on these authors and findings, it is not expectable a different behaviour for the Portuguese family companies after they had gone public. Therefore, we expect that changes on the operational and financial performance will be much more pronounced when firms were restructured prior to sale than in the case of firms that were not restructured prior to sale, wellrestructured firm is better prepared to face the marketplace and, consequently, to improve more its operational, social and financial performance than firms that did not restructured before the sale. In our sample, eight out of twenty-five firms (32%) had restructured before going public while seventeen firms (68%) did not restructure before going public.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present and discuss our empirical findings for the full sample of firms going public and for the subsamples. Our empirical work measures the post going public operational, social, financial performance and dividend policy. In global terms, our investigation confirms, on one hand, that, after going public, as it was expected by us, family firms experience significant declines on average (median) levels. By opposition, firms experience increases in capital investment spending, output, and dividend payout, when compared to pre-going public average (median) values. On the other hand, our findings, in opposite to it was expected, show that firms do not experience improvements in average (median) short term equilibrium and in capital structure levels, when compared to the corresponding average pre-going public values. Table 4 summarises the results for the full sample of all closely held companies that went public by IPO or Direct Sale. We measure profitability by the return on sales indicator (ROS -net income to sales). As we expected, profitability decreases significantly after the sale, with the ROS indicator for the full sample of twenty-five companies. The mean (median) in ROS decrease 10% after the sale, jumping from 29% to 19% (22% to 17%). In addition, 66% (68%) represent the percentage of firms, whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all family firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that ROS decreases significantly (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO. Most of the subsamples also present significant post going public declines in profitability. Six out of fourteen samples observe a significant mean decrease, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before) while six out of fourteen samples observe a significant median decrease, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (afterbefore). The majority of the proportion test statistics (mean and median) are significantly positive. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, in the following subsamples: CEO change in firms, concentration after going public and shareholders in management. Our results are consistent with previous research, namely, Anderson and Reeb (2003) .
We measure operating efficiency with the sales efficiency (SALEFF -sales to total employment). As we expected, operating efficiency decreases significantly after the sale, with the SALEFF indicator for the full sample of twenty-five companies. The mean (median) in SALEFF decrease 29% after the sale, jumping from 164% to 135% (132% to 99%). In addition, 69% (81%) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that SALEFF decreases significantly (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO. Most of the subsamples also present significant post going public declines in operating efficiency. Eleven out of fourteen samples observe a significant mean decrease, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before) while eleven out of fourteen samples observe a significant median decrease, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (afterbefore). Nevertheless, this is not to say that all subsamples experience the same efficiency decline. As a matter of fact, the Kruskal-Wallis shows indicates that companies with the national allocation of control, firms with CEO change and firms with no shareholders in management after going public, experience the greater efficiency difference in the post going public period. Our results show consistency with those found by Ang et al. (2000) .
We measure capital investment spending with the real capital expenditure to sales indicator (RCESA -real capital expenditure to sales). As we expected, capital investment spending increases significantly after going public, for the full sample of twenty-five companies. The mean (median) in RCESA increase 33% after the sale, jumping from 112% to 145% (98% to 117%). In addition, 65% (66%) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values changed as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that RCESA increases significantly (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO.
A great number of the subsamples also present significant post going public increases in capital investment spending. Six out of fourteen samples observe a significant mean increase, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before), while six out of fourteen samples observe a significant median increase, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (after-before). The majority of the proportion test statistics (mean and median) are significantly positive. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, in the following subsamples: firms with concentrated structures after going public and firms with shareholders in management. Our results are similar to the results of Boubakri and Cosset (1998), among others.
We measure the real output with the real sales indicator (SAL -nominal sales to consumer price index). As we expected, real output increased significantly after going public, for the full sample of companies. The mean (median) in SAL increases 138% after the sale, jumping from 111% to 249% (101% to 234%). In addition, 68% (64%) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values changed as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that the SAL indicator increases significantly (at the 5% level) after the IPO. A great number of the subsamples also present significant post going public increases in real output. Twelve out of fourteen samples observe a significant mean increase, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before), while twelve out of fourteen samples observe a significant median increase, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (after-before). The majority of the proportion test statistics (mean and median) are significantly positive. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, in most of the subsamples.
We measure employment by the total employment (EMPL -total number of employees). As we expected, employment decreases not significantly after the sale, for the EMPL indicator for the full sample of companies. The mean (median) in ROS decrease 96 employees after the sale, jumping from 1011 to 915 employees (893 to 843 employees). In addition, 56 percent (52 percent) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests shows that EMPL decreases not significantly (at the 5% level) after going public.
Some of the subsamples also present a not very significant total employment decline. Two out of fourteen samples observe a significant mean decrease, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before) while two out of fourteen samples observe a significant median decrease, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (after-before). The majority of the proportion test statistics (mean and median) are significantly positive. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, in the following subsamples: concentration after going public CEO change in firms, and shareholders in management. This means that by portioning our data into these sub-groups, we find there are significant differences between them. Our results confirm the expectations about the consequences on employment after closely held firms become open to the public and are identical to the conclusions developed by Singh and Davidson III (2003) .
We measure dividend policy by the dividend to sales indicator (DIVSAL -dividend to sales). As we expected, the payout ratio increases significantly after the sale, with the DIVSAL indicator for the full sample of companies. The mean (median) in DIVSAL increase 3% after the sale, jumping from 1% to 4% (1% to 2%). In addition, 56 percent (52 percent) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that DIVSAL increases significantly (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO. Some of the subsamples also present significant post going public increases in the payout ratio. Six out of 14 samples observe a significant mean increase, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before) while six out of fourteen samples observe a significant median increase, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (after-before). The majority of the proportion test statistics (mean and median) are significantly positive. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, in the following subsamples: CEO change in firms, IPO sale and shareholders in management. Our results in dividend policy for companies going public are closed to those shown by La Porta et al. [2000] .
We measure profitability by the return by the sales to total assets indicator (STA -sales divided by Total Assets). As we expected, activity levels decrease significantly after the sale, with the STA indicator for the full sample. The mean (median) in STA decreases 8% after the sale, jumping from 57% to 49% (53% to 42%). In addition, 66 percent (60 percent) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that STA decreases significantly (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO. Some of the subsamples also present significant post going public declines in profitability. Four out of fourteen samples observe a significant mean decrease, as can be observed by the Z-statistics for differences in means (after-before) while four out of 14 samples observe a significant median decrease, based on the Wilcoxon test (Z-statistics for differences in medians (after-before). The majority of the proportion test statistics (mean and median) are significantly positive. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, in the following subsamples: national allocation of control, CEO change in firms and shareholders in management.
We measure short-term equilibrium with the cash and banks to short-term debt indicator (CBTSTD -cash and banks divided by short-term debt). As we expected, short-term equilibrium levels decrease significantly after the sale, with the CBTSTD indicator for the full sample. The mean (median) in CBTSTD decreases 35% after the sale, jumping from 65% to 31% (19% to 8%). In addition, 36 percent (38 percent) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that CBTSTD decreases significantly (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, such as in shareholders in management
We measure capital structure by the total debt to total assets indicator (TDTA -total debt to total assets). As we expected, capital structure is negatively affected by going public, as shown by the TDTA indicator for the full sample companies. The mean (median) in TDTA increase 5% after the sale, jumping from 52% to 57% (43% to 49%). In addition, 38 percent (44 percent) represent the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted. In global terms, for the full sample of all closely-held firms going public, Wilcoxon tests show that TDTA increases (at the 5 percent level) after the IPO. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows significant differences, at a 5% significance level, in average and medium levels, such as shareholders in management.
CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the change in the operational, social and financial performance of firms that make the transition from private closely held ownership to public ownership through initial public offerings (IPOs) or direct sales (DSs). The operational, social and financial analysis is concerned in the following areas: profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment, real output, employment, dividend policy, activity levels, short-term equilibrium, and capital structure.
Over the last two decades, we have observed many closely held (family) firms opening their capital to new investors. An event as an IPO or direct sale and its consequences raises many doubts, namely, which will be the future performance of the public firm. Abroad, till now, the investigation known is scarce and ignores the financial side of the firm's performance, In Portugal, there is no work on this field, for these family firms that are sold through an IPO or direct sale. Because of that, our work wants to fill in this gap.
In addition, our investigation adds the contribution to observing the different behaviour of several sub-samples: competitive and no competitive sector, national and foreign allocation of control, CEO change and no CEO change, concentrated and no concentrated structures, going public by IPO or direct sale, shareholders in management and no shareholders in management, firms restructured and firms not restructured before going public. Also, the period of the sample, fifteen years, is sufficiently ample to value the investigation. Finally, our work is the first one with these objectives and mission already developed in Portugal.
Overall, in aggregate terms, the results show that family exhibit superior firm performance relative to no family firms. Using economic, social and financial based measures of firm performance, we find that closely held firms are significantly better performers than no family firms. Our results are statistically significant and robust, with the inclusion of different subsamples and ownership groups and alternative variable measures.
On the economic side, we find that firms going public exhibit a significant decline in post-issue economic performance. Over several years before the sale, until several years after the offering, depending on the available information, the operational and economic performance of firms after going public declined significantly relative to their pre-IPO levels, based on several economic and operational indicators. Despite an increase in capital expenditure and output levels, the pre-IPO performance levels are not sustained, leading to a decline in expectations. Earlier studies have shown low stock returns for issuing firms for several years subsequent to going public.
The analysis also provides evidence that firms that do not change their CEO, firms that have shareholders in management and firms with concentrated ownership structures after going public, show the less unfavourable results, as far as the economic and operational performance are concerned. Our conclusions found that firms going public exhibit a substantial decline in post-issue operating performance.
On the employment side, on aggregate terms, taken as a whole, our results show a not very significant decline in employment after firms going public that is, our evidence shows a small decline in employment levels. This decline in employment can be only considered relevant for the following subsamples: in first place, when there are shareholders in management and when there is a new CEO after the going public process, suggesting a negative relation between employment and the presence of shareholders in management and the presence of a new CEO after the divestiture.
By last, on the financial side, in aggregate terms, taken as a whole, our results show a certain decline on the financial equilibrium of firms after going public, not only their short-term equilibrium but also their capital structure. The financial situation is directly related to the economic situation, since, after going public, firms become less profitable and less efficient. This decline in profitability and in activity levels has a negative impact on the financial equilibrium of those firms.
In conclusion, taken as a whole, our evidence implies that closely held (family) companies perform better than no family companies. Our findings suggest that continued closely held ownership, in and of itself, is not necessarily a less effective organisation structure. On the contrary, our results are robust and present evidence that the economic, employment and financial situation of firms after going public becomes worst. The family organisation structure reduces agency costs without leading to losses in decision-making efficiency, profitability and financial equilibrium. In addition, the debt exposure typically decreases after the IPO. Such drop appears to be permanent and, because of that, the IPO may be viewed as a mean to rebalance the capital structure.
